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ABSTRACT
The Collaborative Authentication (co-authentication) system is an authentication system
that relies on some or all members of a pre-registered set of secure hardware tokens being
concurrently present to an authentication server at the moment of authentication. Previous
researchers have compared various embodiments of the co-authentication system to each other
including using Quick Response (QR) codes/cellphone cameras and Near Field Communication
(NFC) between tokens. This thesis concerns the initial design and implementation of empirical
comparative testing mechanisms between one embodiment of the co-authentication system and
other commonly used authentication systems. One contribution is the simulated standard user ID
and password login in a computer browser and a simulated RSA SecureID ® one time password
(OTP) and login with embedded usability testing mechanisms. Another contribution is the
development and implementation of a new Bluetooth communication functionality between
tokens. A third contribution is the addition of usability testing mechanisms to two versions of
this new functionality.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Authentication is an age-old problem. The word authentication is derived from the
Greek: αὐθεντικός authentikos, "real, genuine” [27]. While identification is the making of a
claim or offering proof of identity, authentication is the verification and confirmation of that
proof. Generally, the owner of a resource (rights holder) has an interest in controlling who is
able to see or use their resource to protect his/her ownership rights and uses authentication for
this purpose. It is important to him/her to ensure that a person or entity requesting access is who
they represent themselves to be in order to be able to properly grant or deny access to the
intended recipient.

1.1 Authentication in a Computer Context
In cybersecurity, authentication is the automated verification of the identity, source or
process (user and/or device) who is requesting access to data, applications or other resources
stored in a computer accessible medium. When it receives a request for access from a user’s
computer, the rights holder’s computer requests credentials from the user and the credentials
provided are compared to those on file in a database of authorized users' information on a local
operating system or within an authentication server. If the credentials match, the process is
completed and the user is granted authorization for access.
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In the modern highly networked world, the quantity of requests for access occurs on a
massive scale and each request must be handled quickly and accurately every time. The
consequences of just one access-control failure with an active adversary may be total
compromise of the system and theft or vandalism of the resource (such as data corruption or
denial of service). A trust relationship may be established for further interactions if the
authentication is successful. Access control, including authentication, protects the traditional
security attributes of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information and also other
important aspects including accountability, non-repudiation and reliability [20].

1.2 Authentication Factors
There are three general categories of authentication methods:
– what-you-have (i.e. hardware or software tokens),
– what-you-know (i.e. passwords, PINs) or
– what-you-are (i.e. physical traits for biometric measurement, location).
These are known as the authentication factors [37]. “One factor authentication” means if one
factor is verified then access is granted. If two different factors have to be independently
verified then this is “two factor authentication” and is theoretically significantly more secure
because an attacker will have to independently compromise both factors. What-you-know,
specifically a user-memorized password typed in to a computer log-in screen upon request, is the
most common single factor used in computer user authentication because this method is easy and
cheap to implement by the system owner and is secure enough for low and medium level
security applications if used correctly. Cryptographically signed certificates with providence
from trusted authorities (similar to an evidence chain of custody) have been found to be useful
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for authentication for higher security needs. Public key cryptography uses computationally
complex mathematical functions that are impractical to invert to transform digital data for
encrypted transmittal.

1.3 Authentication Threats
By design, digital data is easy to copy and manipulate and computer networks facilitate
the flow of digital information. The multitude of security vulnerabilities and exposures to
networked computers are only limited by the imaginations, technical capability and motivation
of attackers. Attack vectors exist for hardware and software and there are multiple taxonomies
for organizing these. Some common access control attack vectors are phishing, worms, viruses,
social engineering, Trojan horse, physical theft and denial of service. Some well-known access
control systems include: password, PIN, challenge response, security question, ID card, security
token (hardware or software), biometric (fingerprint, retinal pattern signature, face, voice, typing
pattern, walk, location etc.)
One important consideration is that authentication security needs to be proportional to
the value of what is protected. In a resource constrained world, attackers generally have a profit
model and spend their resources targeting the highest value users and files. There is wide
variance in cost in both time and money to individuals and organizations of access control
systems. It is highly inefficient and a poor use of highly skilled resources to just blanketly
maximize all security settings without evaluating actual security risks. Security models must be
intelligently designed to maximize effectiveness and efficiency [28].
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CHAPTER 2
MOTIVATION FOR USABILITY TESTING AND RELATED WORK

Usability is defined as “the extent to which a product can be used by specified users to
achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a specified context of
use” [20]. In other words, usability is the degree to which a product or service meets a user’s
needs [1]. A system’s effectiveness relates to whether it works for its intended purpose. The
primary purpose of access control systems is to protect digital data from falling into the wrong
hands either inadvertently or by intentional theft. The two failure states are 1) if an unauthorized
person obtains access or 2) if an authorized person is unable to obtain access. Asymmetrical
risks/consequences of the corresponding two failure states usually mean more attention is paid to
blocking unauthorized entities.

2.1 Unusable Security Systems are Not Secure
Unusable security systems, no matter how provably secure in theory they are, fail in
their primary purpose if users do not use them as the systems designers anticipate [40].
Passwords, for example, effectively shift the burden of access onto the users who are required to
remember intentionally complex and hard to guess passwords for multiple systems. There has
been a great deal of research showing that this burden leads to insecure adaptations by users that
ultimately result in significantly less security than the system designers expect [1,3,7,8, 9,
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14,17,19, 21,22, 29, 33, 39,40]. There are also studies showing many people will avoid products
with cumbersome security if they can and go to competitors [19,21,22,33].

2.2 Reasons that Poor Usability Occurs
There are many reasons why poor usability occurs. There is a fundamental conflict
between the reward structures of users who use the computer to do a primary task and security
system designers who are penalized only if security failures happen and suffer no consequences
for unusable system design. There are divergent expectations when users see security features
only as a hindrance to doing their jobs which may lead them to create work-arounds to the
security features versus security system designers who expect users to prioritize security and take
the time to learn and comply with the security tools. There is also mutual lack of
training/expertise in that most users do not understand security failures or see their results and
may believe that security is not a daily concern so they make up their own ad hoc security
methods and system designers rarely have training or expertise in psychology or human factors
or even the context in which their system is used by users so they fail to take these things into
consideration in the design.

2.2.1 Conflict in Goals and Motivations Between Designer/User
One significant problem is an inherent conflict in motivation and goals of users versus
resource owners and security system designers [10, 14, 21 29]. The user may not see access to
the resource as an end in itself – s/he wants easy access to the resource to complete his/her
primary task because that is what s/he is rewarded to do [1,3,14,17,21,29]. Since users don’t
generally see security risks they don’t see them as much of a problem [1, 8, 21]. In the best case
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users may see security as a distraction or hindrance imposed on them to protect them from a
threat they don’t know exists. The resource owner’s priority is to protect access to the resource
and s/he may consider user costs to be collateral or extrinsic to the protection function. Security
system designers do not generally have any consequences [14] for unusable design and, like
lawyers, are primarily paid to mitigate any risk no matter how small [28]. Security experts may,
in fact, overprotect because of their reward structure - they are penalized if problems occur so
why take any chances [1, 9, 28, 33].

2.2.2 Divergent Expectations
One of the biggest problems for the user is any system or tool clashing with their
expectations of how it should work [40]. Users may also be confused when they see
disagreement among experts and this may give them doubts about the accuracy of any security
information. They see many false positives such as certificate configuration errors and the
experts tell them to just “click through” those because they are not “real” problems. The users
also may see many things that to the careless reader, can be confused for security warnings such
as click-wrap agreements and may get dialog fatigue.
Some computer system designers see usability as merely “interface” or “common
sense” and see themselves as average users [3, 22, 40]. This is rarely the case because designers
self-select for a specific type of intelligence, reasoning ability and diligence and are not
necessarily representative of general population. There also may be cultural differences. System
designers may get frustrated by “stupid” users and may see their task as “idiot proofing”.
Designers are very close to their design and no one, no matter how intelligent, can truly see their
own work objectively. Generally designers work in small teams. There are many many users
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and the best designer can’t possibly be as smart as a large, motivated, diverse collective
intelligence (this phenomenon is known as hive-mind or crowdsourcing).

2.2.3 Lack of Expertise/Training
Users generally do not understand security risks. They are not told details by the
experts because, generally speaking, many users don’t care but also because they wouldn’t
understand the risks unless they are translated into specific guidance. It takes time and skilled
manpower to translate risks into specific security guidance and most companies want designers
to design not “waste their time” translating. Another difficulty is the fact that security threats
evolve very quickly and it would take more time to translate each one than to just handle the
problem and in most cases users will never know the risk existed. Companies are also fearful of
exposing weaknesses and may only report a problem if they have to under the most lenient
interpretation of reporting law. Companies see security problems as proprietary information and
may not want to tell employees who don’t have a need to know because they fear they might leak
this information to the market in an uncontrolled manner and hurt the company’s reputation.
Designers are generally not given the tools to be able to gauge the impact of their design
choices on “typical” users. It is very rare for computer system developers to have education or
training in cognitive psychology, or any brain science and they may not understand the users’
bias, framing, or cognitive load [14, 17, 25]. Very few designers have training in user
expectation management. Even if they did they might not have the mindset to appreciate that
users might have a usefully different perspective or in fact have anything valuable to add to the
design of a system. Some developers may have poor communication skills and may not have
experience communicating with people who are different from themselves. Steve Jobs famously
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said “A lot of times, people don’t know what they want until you show it to them” [46]. Many
designers believe they are lone geniuses creating “art” (and some of them are).

2.3 Usability Now Seen to Add Value
When security software was designed and used only by other technical experts,
usability was considered optional or, worst case, a sign of weakness or an insult to your
colleague’s intelligence. Usability generally didn’t matter until users became potential
customers. It still tends to only be fully studied when usability problems occur [14]. The
process of usability testing is evolving. In the early days there was none; a common attitude was
almost ship it and let the market tell us what’s wrong with it. Later, usability was seen as merely
a “packaging” activity after all the functional work was done.
Usability testing in agile engineering and software production is widely now seen as a
valuable development tool and is done at a smaller scale more frequently in the design process
[33]. One guiding principal is that the earlier in the production process that problems are found,
the cheaper it is to correct them [22, 33]. Perfect usability of an authentication system from user
perspective is when it is invisible, it “just works”. Security features should be proportional to
risk, and have minimum disruption to user.

2.4 Testing Early and Often in the Design Process
Usability is greatly improved by usability testing early and often in design process [14,
26, 30]. Usability testing adds the most value if it includes testing the system or product on
people who share as many characteristics with potential real users as possible [19, 26, 30].
Optimally usability testing uses classical experimental methodology including development of a
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hypothesis and controls and experimentation to isolate one variable at a time and the use of
samples and statistical modeling to properly infer the results onto the general population [17, 19,
22, 26, 30, 36]. Depending on the stage of product development, other, less costly, usability
testing methods may be used but the closer to classical experimental methodology, the more
valuable the results.

2.4.1 Usability Laboratory
Experiments are done under controlled conditions in a laboratory and consist of test
participants (TPs) being given specific tasks to perform that include using the system or product
under testing. Many versions of each experiment are given to each TP – a baseline/control
version and as many versions as necessary to isolate and modify one feature at a time to be
tested. The test administrators (TAs) include cognitive psychologists who observe the TPs
during the experiment and document body language, hesitation, tone of voice and other
behavioral clues that may indicate what the TP is thinking (and may not be saying). The
laboratory is a mockup office setting, for example, with a believable product and scenario that
will induce the TPs to treat it “normally”. The computer that the TP uses contains tracking
software that runs in the background to collect keystrokes, event timing, task success rate and
other data. The laboratory is equipped with cameras, eye-tracking equipment, one way mirrors
and an in-room moderator observing and encouraging the TP to think out loud. Developers are
encouraged to attend to see first hand how users see their product. TPs are also given
preliminary questionnaires to enable TAs to categorize them by experience level and
demographics and then subjective questionnaires after each test and then overall asking how well
they liked using the product. Depending on the stage of development, resources available and
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cost of potentially poor usability to the developer, sometimes usability testing is done remotely
by crowd sourcing [39] or via virtual world simulations [26] with the obvious tradeoffs of lack of
detailed observation and environmental controls [30].

2.4.2 Heuristic Analysis
Cognitive psychologists can also do theoretical usability studies [30]. Some of these
include breaking the authentication tasks down into micro-actions and trace different areas of
brain usage (i.e. visual working memory, procedural memory, declarative recall, semantic
recognition, etc.) used in performing the authentication steps to ensure an optimal mental flow
when performing the required steps [14]. Behavioral Psychologists are also able to help in the
analysis of a particular authentication model, how bias, framing and cognitive load lead to
specific user visualizations and expectations [14, 17, 28, 29]. Some usability experts use
keystroke level modeling [17] and the NASA-TLX workload assessment instrument [18, 26] to
analyze total user burden [39] in authentication.

2.4.3 General Types of Usability Testing
There are two categories of usability testing: 1) Formative – finding and fixing usability
problems or 2) Summative – describing the usability of an application using metrics [30]. Often
benchmarks are used for usability comparison and comparisons include different versions of the
same product or a competitor’s products [14, 29, 36]. Within subjects design is when the same
TPs attempt tasks on all versions and between subjects design is when different sets of users test
each version. Results are tabulated immediately and statistically analyzed to accept or reject
hypotheses and to determine what variable performed the best and also to ensure statistical
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significance of findings (confidence interval) and look for causality [30]. The data from many
experiments are compared to look for differences in relative variance (ANOVA) [19, 20, 36].
The TPs are also analyzed using skill level and demographics to ensure representativeness
(stratified sampling) and randomness. Developers can iteratively make revisions based on new
information and continually improve the product’s usability. If the developer is lucky the TPs
might get frustrated and demonstrate a cheat or workaround that shows the developer where the
holes in the system security are located. Companies such as Google and Amazon have pioneered
A/B testing which is a rapid usability comparison of two versions of a webpage, for example, on
a massive scale. They are able to make and test iterative improvements on an almost real time
basis.

2.4.4 Subjective User Testing
SUS is a very well-studied, simple, 10 question Likert scale test designed to measure a
user’s subjective perception of his/her own satisfaction with a product or service [11,12]. There
are “standard” modifications to the original format and a large pool of historical data from other
uses is available [4, 25]. It is a straightforward matter to calculate standard statistical
measurements on the data obtained (mean, variance, t-test) and compare our empirical data to
historical data to ensure statistical significance [4, 5, 6, 17, 18, 23, 25, 35].
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CHAPTER 3
THE COLLABORATIVE AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM

The Collaborative Authentication (co-authentication) System1 was developed by a
University of South Florida (USF) research team led by Dr. Jay Ligatti for secure authentication
of a user of a network resource, for defense against physical theft of secure devices and for
resistance to Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. One embodiment of this system is
based on the mutual exchange of cryptographically-signed credentials between two or more
hardware tokens with each other and with an authentication server resulting in an associated set
of hardware tokens known to the server. In this embodiment, the authentication server then
allows system access for any one token if and only if all or a predetermined subset of the
authorized tokens concurrently respond correctly to cryptographic challenges. This embodiment
of the system uses a single factor (hardware token) but has an increased level of security
indistinguishable from multi-factor authentication because of the additional “quorum of tokens”
requirement [15, 38].

1

Important Note: This thesis concerns one version of one embodiment of Dr. Ligatti and his
team’s inventive concepts. Nothing in this thesis should be construed as limiting existing or
future intellectual property rights in any way.
12

3.1 History of the Project
Dr. Ligatti’s research team, co-chaired by Dr. Dmitry Goldgof, was originally
comprised of PhD Candidates Cagri Cetin and Jean-Baptiste Subils who did the initial research
and submitted two US Patent Applications, one of which was awarded on 6/28/16 (US
9,380,058) and the other (application number 14/693,490) was allowed on 1/13/17 (the patent
number will be assigned as soon as fees are paid). I joined the team in 2015 and Shamaria
Engram (PhD candidate) joined in 2016. Mr. Cetin and Mr. Sublis developed an authorization
server and Android applications to represent the multiple hardware tokens to model and test the
Collaborative Authentication System [15, 38]. Mr. Sublis and Ms. Engram researched usability
and developed a usability Requirements Document [included herein as Appendix A]. My
contribution to the project was to: 1) develop a new Android application adding Bluetooth
communication capability between tokens, and, guided by the usability requirements document,
2) to modify the existing co-authentication Android applications and authentication server to
implement specific usability experiments and 3) to design and implement new simulations of
comparable well-known authentication systems (user-password and one time password hardware
token) for comparison and also include integrated usability experiments.

3.2 Co-authentication Functionality
One embodiment of the co-authentication system is use by a server to authenticate a
computer user who requests access to network resources. One implementation of the coauthentication system is comprised of an associated set of two or more hardware tokens and an
authentication server. Each hardware token, by definition, is a “portable, user controlled
physical device…used to store cryptographic information and possibly also perform
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cryptographic functions” [37]. In this context, tokens must also be able to communicate with the
server (i.e. they must be “smart” devices). In this implementation, each user will have two or
more tokens, preferably devices s/he already owns (phone, laptop, watch, etc.) Before this
embodiment of the co-authentication system can be used there is an initialization step which
includes registering/device-pairing/associating all of the tokens with the authentication server so
the server has a list for each user of all the user’s device names and each device’s public key. In
this embodiment the communications between the tokens and between the tokens and the server
will be encrypted so they each need to know each other’s public keys in line with public key
cryptography. Figure 3.1 details the co-authentication protocol of this implementation.

Figure 3.1. Co-authentication Protocol. This shows the communication between the server and
the tokens. The communications are labeled steps 1-6 and the time that each communication is
initiated is labeled T1-T7.
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In each step described in the following sections, the message (the request, the challenge
or the session key) is bundled with the identification of the sender and a timestamp (to defend
against replay attacks) and encrypted with the sender’s private key. The bundle is then signed
with the recipient’s public key and sent. Other embodiments may have different configurations.
The co-authentication protocol in this implementation is comprised of the following steps:

3.2.1 Step 1
One token associated with a user (the Requestor) sends an encrypted access request to
the authentication server (the Authenticator). This request is signed with the Requestor’s private
key and the bundle is encrypted with the Authenticator’s public key. In one embodiment of this
protocol, the request is sent to the server via a wireless network.

3.2.2 Step 2
The Authenticator receives the encrypted message and decrypts it with its private key.
The Authenticator uses the sending device’s name to retrieve a list of the device names and
public keys of the sending device’s associated device(s) (these are known now as the
Collaborator(s)). The Authenticator generates a challenge (e.g. a nonce), bundles it, signs it with
its private key and encrypts it with the Requestor’s public key and sends the challenge to the
Requestor.

3.2.3 Step 3
The Requestor receives the encrypted challenge and decrypts it using its own private
key. The Requestor re-bundles the challenge with its own device name and signs it using its own
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private key and the public key of each of its associated devices (the Collaborator(s)). The
Requestor sends the encrypted challenge on to one or more of the Collaborator(s). This can be
done by any communications channel between the devices. Mr. Cetin and Mr. Subils did
extensive research successfully using Near Field Communication (NFC) and QR code/cell phone
camera as a between-token communication channel. One of my tasks on this project was to
implement a Bluetooth communication channel for this step (detailed below in section 3.4).
There are many other creative and secure ways to communicate this information and this will be
an area of further research.

3.2.4 Step 4
Each Collaborator receives and decrypts the challenge sent to it using its own private
key. Each collaborator then signs the challenge with its private key and encrypts it with the
Authenticator’s public key and send it back to the Authenticator as a challenge response. Public
Key cryptography ensures that, without telling the secret, the Authenticator is assured that the
recipients have been able to decrypt the secret and thus are present in the associated token group.
Other embodiments might use a shared private key initially transmitted via an out-of-band
channel or may use some other encryption mechanism.

3.2.5 Step 5
The Authenticator validation algorithm requires responses from a preset number of
Collaborators. When a challenge request is received, the Authenticator stores the challenge
request and waits for as many challenge responses as the validation algorithm requires. To do
this the Authenticator runs the following validation algorithm:
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1) take a current time measurement, subtract the time measurement taken at in step 2, above,
when the original challenge was sent out. If the time elapsed is within a preset threshold
go to the next step, else return an error message to the Requestor that the request is not
authorized.
2) decrypt the message and store the sender’s device name and the timestamp.
3) check the message to see if it is valid, if valid go on to next step, else return an error
message to the Requestor that the request is not authorized.
4) check the name of the device against the associated device list it received in the initiation
step. If the device is listed go on to next step, else return an error message to the
Requestor that the request is not authorized.
5) check the security policy which defines the precise requirements to approve the
authentication. The security policy may list all the user’s associated devices and the
algorithm will require challenge responses from all but the Requestor. The security
policy may be more expressive and allow approval, for example, if m-out-of-n devices
are present or if certain required devices are present or according to some “weighting” of
devices (giving some devices more “votes”), else return an error message to the
Requestor that the request is not authorized.
6) returns approve or not approve
7) if not approve then waits for another message from another Collaborator until a time limit
causes it to drop out of the wait loop.
8) If the validation algorithm returns approval then the Authenticator creates a session key,
bundles it with the Requestor’s public key and encrypts it with one (randomly chosen) of
the Collaborators’ public keys, and sends it to that Collaborator, else returns an error
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message to the Requestor that the request is not authorized.

3.2.6 Step 6
The Collaborator decrypts the encrypted message when it receives it from the
Authenticator. The Collaborator signs the session key with its secret key, encrypts it with the
Requestor’s public key and sends it to the Requestor by one of many possible communication
channels. Part of my task was to write Android applications to transfer this message by
Bluetooth (see section 3.4, below). The Requestor is now authorized and can now use the
session key to access the resource it was originally requesting.

3.3 Advantages/Disadvantages of the Co-authentication System
Some of the benefits of many of the embodiments of the co-authentication system
include that it is potentially quicker and easier to use than other authentication systems. One of
the purposes of this usability testing is to prove this empirically. We believe that coauthentication is just as secure as other systems and Mr. Cetin has performed formal ProVerif
modeling to demonstrate this [15]. We believe this system is scalable due to the low user burden
(also to be shown in usability testing). The system benefits from more expressive options
defined in protocols such as 1) allowing access with subset of devices available, 2) certain
devices can have differing weight/votes in access/no access decision, 3) system can allow
situational exclusion, and 4) system can make the presence on the network of certain devices
required.
There are, however, some areas that still need work including ease of initial set up
overhead. There is also a need to mitigate the steal-in-place scenario when one of the devices is
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compromised but still in the network so the network still works but the compromise is not
discovered by the user. Continuing intermittent network communication checks may be one way
to uncover the theft.

3.4 New Bluetooth Token Communication Channel
Bluetooth is communication standard for a short wavelength (2.4 GHz band), short
range (100 feet in version 2.0, 200 feet in version 4.0 and 800 feet in version 5) radio
communication protocol. It is optimized to work in a high interference environment by using a
frequency-hopping spread spectrum technology. Bluetooth divides information into packets and
pseudo-randomly transmits each packet on one of 79 channels (each having a bandwidth of 1
MHz) at approximately 800 hops per second for the “classic” Bluetooth implementation.
Bluetooth has a master-slave structure with one master and up to seven slaves in a “piconet”.
They all share one clock and two devices can communicate at any one time, with, for example,
the master transmitting in even number time slots and receiving in odd, and vice-versa for the
slave. A device can be in discoverable mode and transmit its connection information. A master
can scan with an antenna to find discoverable (and not previously discovered) devices and,
generally with user interaction, pair with those devices. Once bonded, the devices can
communicate via the radio frequencies listed above as long as they are both within range [16].

3.4.1 Co-authentication Collaboration
This embodiment of the co-authentication protocol is designed to have the flexibility to
allow almost any form of secure communication between devices in the process of collaboration
to the Authenticator. In their initial proof of concept, Mr. Cetin and Mr. Sublis implemented QR
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and NFC communication functions between the devices [15, 38]. To extend this work I added
Bluetooth functionality. To improve the developer usability, I also added comments and
software “hooks” in the code to show future developers where to put future extensions of
authentication functionality such as biometric authentication. I added comments in the android
and server side code to label the timestamps (T1-T7) and Steps 1-6.
To implement Bluetooth functionality, I used Android libraries and also modeled Mr.
Cetin’s Java code in Android Studio that he used to create QR and NFC communication
functions. I created two new Bluetooth communication activities, created or linked all the
supporting sub-functions and modified Mr. Cetin’s existing authentication server structure,
detailed in steps 1-6, above, to allow the new activities to work.

3.4.2 Send Activity
I created a send activity. I added a Bluetooth option into the select activity menu. This
function is called between step 2 and step 3, above, by the Requestor and the activity is step 3.
This function uses Bluetooth Adapter and Bluetooth Service to get the challenge message from
the Authenticator. It displays a layout activity while it is processing the incoming message.
I added a connection manager to look for other Bluetooth devices in range and manage
all the connection details. This function then sends a small message to ensure connectivity and
calls appropriate error handling if that is not the case. The function calls security manager from
connection manager to decrypt the challenge message using its own secret key. It gets it as a
byte array and converts it into a string. At this time, for demonstration purposes, the code does
not include the full encryption in step 3, above, and for testing the system is only currently set up
for only one collaborator.
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3.4.3 Scan Activity
I created a scan activity. This activity also sends out a small message to ensure
connectivity and calls appropriate error handling if that is not the case. This activity listens for
and accepts a Bluetooth radio signal by calling the Bluetooth connection function, and calls a
message handler which receives and stores the incoming message.
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CHAPTER 4
PROPOSED EMPIRICAL TESTING DESIGN

The co-authentication system is in early development and has not been integrated into
any products at this time. Mr. Cetin and Mr. Sublis did initial proof-of-concept work including
designing and implementing an authentication server and implementing between token
communication using QR codes/cellphone camera and NFC. Mr. Cetin did initial functional
testing of two versions of the co-authentication system including approximating execution time,
network usage, memory usage and battery consumption [15]. My thesis covers the next phase of
initial usability testing which is limited empirical comparative testing between the coauthentication system and outside authentication systems. The testing functionality and select
data collection has been coded and is operational as further proof-of-concept work. The testing
modules described in this thesis are not intended to be stand-alone and are intended to be
integrated into a larger testing construct preferably including realistic mock tasks for a user to do.
Some authentication system usability researchers have created mock airport ticketing kiosks [17]
and others have created a mock cellphone helpdesk forum [31], mock banking websites [31] and
mock telephone banking formats [19]. The proposed tests in this thesis are visualized and
described here as if they are stand-alone tests in a laboratory setting to detail the intended
context and to highlight the maximal measurement capability but the full implementation of this
usability testing is left for future work.
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For the proposed preliminary comparative usability experiments my research team and I
designed four independent testing modules. We chose the two baseline tests in order to compare
our system to the most commonly used authentication solutions. It is important to the
experimental design to choose and accurately measure features of each authentication system
that are statistically comparable to each other from system to system. We chose to record the
time it takes test participants to complete comparable components of each authentication task.
The users’ success rates are also important information and can be measured and added as future
work. The experiments are numbered in this thesis for identification but in the actual testing
they will be in random order for every test participant and will each be completed several times.
Random order and repetitive testing of the same task has been suggested by many authors as a
best practice to avoid the effects of learning bias [30]. The testing constructs are listed below in
Table 4.1.

Table 4.1. Proposed Usability Experiments
Test 1

Baseline 1

A reproduction of a standard username-password log-in in a
computer browser

Test 2

Baseline 2

A reproduction of an RSA SecureID®-like token generating
a One Time Password (OTP) and simulated login

Test 3

Our Method “A”

The Collaborative Authentication System, Fully Automatic

Test 4

Our Method “B”

The Collaborative Authentication System, with Control
Button
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WordPress is written in PHP and contains HTML, Perl and Javascript code intermixed.
The login portion of WordPress is organized as a classic client-server. In this experiment the
computer facing the TP acts as both the client and server because it is a login simulation. I made
several modifications to WordPress Version 4.5.6.
I modified the CSS code in the client to make the user login screen visually match the
login screen experiment specifications. In addition, after each type of testing each test
participant will be given a subjective questionnaire from which we can learn their preferences.
We will also give them an opportunity to make suggestions for improvements. Throughout this
thesis I refer to Test Administrators as TAs and Test Participants as TPs.

4.1 Test 1
The most commonly used computer user authentication system is a computer user
typing a memorized username and password into a browser, the browser communicates securely
with a server to compare the input to previously stored data and returns notice of access success
or failure to the user. In order to use data from this type of system as an experimental baseline,
my research team and I decided to reproduce a username-login system in a controlled
environment and obtain usability data from a test participant (TP)’s interaction with this system.
One of my tasks was the software implementation of the TP-facing screens and the integrated
data collection functionality.

4.1.1 Summary of Functionality
For this experiment I created a user interface and data collection system by making
modifications to the well-known, stable, secure, open-source content management system
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WordPress [44]. WordPress is designed to allow users to manage their own websites or blogs
and offers templates and allows plug-ins to extend the functionality for website or blog
customization. WordPress is generally installed on a server and acts as a network host. I
isolated and used WordPress’s username-password login functionality and modified it to fit the
experiment specifications defined by my research teammates. I traced and used the built-in
WordPress encrypted communication functions. I also added the functionality of 1) collecting
time data triggered by certain user inputs, 2) automatically performing calculations on this data,
and 3) pushing the processed output to a server where I had created a data structure to hold it.

4.1.2 Experimental Set-up
As previously described, all four experiment modules are intended to be integrated into
a larger testing construct with integrated user instructions, test functionality and data collection.
Test 1 can be visualized to require a standard office desk and chair and a standard laptop or
desktop computer with a standard display and keyboard. There will be a page of ten
“passwords” of increasing length and complexity on the desk or written on a nearby whiteboard,
if available. All experiment instructions to the TPs, activities performed by the TPs and data
collection will be done on the computer, no network connection is required for this experiment.
No other equipment will be visible to the TP during this test.

4.1.3 Operation of Experiment
After greeting the TPs and after administering the short background questionnaire
described previously, the TAs will instruct the TPs to follow the experiment instructions on the
computer with no further priming. The first screen the TP sees will be will be a simple one page
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instruction showing a sample login screen and instructing the TP to type in the passwords in the
order they see them, one at a time, and showing a photo of the login screen with a large arrow
pointing to the “submit” button. The instruction will tell them if they make a mistake before they
hit the submit button they should backspace and correct it and if they type it in wrong and get a
login failure message they should type that password in again until they are successful.
The TP will type in each password and get a success or failure page that is visible for 10 seconds.
The screen will then go back to the login screen. Figure 4.1 shows the login screen. Figure 4.2
shows the screen after an incorrect password has been entered.

Figure 4.1. Test 1 Login Screen. Note that the username has been pre-filled by the system. All
the user needs to do is type in the password.
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Figure 4.2. Test 1 Error Message. This figure shows the error message that appears if the login
is not successful.

After a TP types in ten passwords successfully, the computer will then display a
standardized usability SUS [11,12]] questionnaire relating to the experience that the TP just had
of typing in a password. The system will collect timing and accuracy information from the TPs
actions and will also store the TP’s responses to the usability questionnaire. The TAs will later
retrieve raw and calculated data and questionnaire responses from all the experiment TPs in one
report for statistical analysis. The final page of the questionnaire will instruct the TP to wait for
further instruction and will notify the TA to come start the next test.

4.1.4 Detail of the Code
The code modifications relate to changing the login screen’s appearance and the
collection of data. These changes were made in HTML, Javascript and Perl.
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4.1.4.1 Login Screen Appearance
1) I removed extraneous items on the login page, by commenting them out
2) I moved the location of the login and password prompts on the screen and changed their
format
3) I filled in the username with a constant “TestParticipant” that will show on the screen so
the only thing the user has to do is type in the password.
4) I moved the submit button’s location on the screen, changed its color and changed the
wording on the button

4.1.4.2 Login Screen Data Collection
I made several changes to module “wp-login.php”. These include:
1) I modified the form in HTML in the client that is displayed in the user’s browser window
2) I embedded, in the HTML form, event listeners such as “on click” that would call a time
collection function when the user did specific things on the login form: such as navigate
to the login screen, put his/her cursor in the password text box, end typing in the
password text box and click the submit button.
3) I created hidden fields in the form.
4) I captured the current time when this code is run (when the test starts), convert the time
object into an integer (milliseconds since the epoch) and set the value in a hidden form
field. The current development code displays this label and value (and each of the
others) on the console for troubleshooting. I recommend this remain in the code until we
need a “production” software version immediately before testing.
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5) I created a Javascript event handler function that captures the time when the user places
his/her cursor in the password box, converts the time object into an integer and set the
value in a hidden form field.
6) I created a Javascript event handler function that captures the time when the user
removes his/her cursor from the password box, converts the time object into an integer
and set the value in a hidden form field. I also calculate the time difference between step
4 and 5 and step 5 and 6 and put these values into hidden form fields.
7) I created a Javascript event handler function that captures the time when the user clicks
the submit button, converts the time object into an integer and set the value in a hidden
form field.
8) I created a Javascript function that calculates the difference between collected times. In
this way we obtain both the time the user actively types in the password and the total
time s/he is on the login screen.
9) I created a new file on the server. I wrote the labels relating to the following data to the
file: start time, time password started, time password stopped, amount of time to type in
password, and time sign in clicked. I then retrieved and posted to newfile.txt the data
that is in the corresponding variables. I used this data to calculate total log in time,
created another label called “total log in time” and posted the label and the calculated
data to the new file. Each time the user clicks the “submit” button, the client browser
posts a line of data to the server and this is concatenated into the newfile.txt file. The
experimental design calls for the accumulation of data in the newfile.txt file during the
administration of the experiment and at the end of the experiment retrieval of the data in
a block by the researchers for analysis. This format is intended to preserve the integrity
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and metadata of the original data and minimize the possibility of inadvertent or
intentional data modification.

4.2 Test 2
Another well-known authentication system that we chose to use as a baseline for our
usability testing is the RSA SecurID ® system [32]. This is a hardware token such as a key fob
which is manufactured with a preset “seed” random key and a built-in clock and is pre-registered
to a particular username on an authentication server. The token generates and displays a series
of one time passwords (OTPs) at fixed time intervals using a cryptographic algorithm. The user
views the display on the token at that moment and manually copies the values displayed on the
token into a login display using the keyboard of the device for which s/he is requesting
authentication. The authentication server where the token is registered has a database of
usernames, the corresponding seed values of their tokens, and also has a synchronized clock.
When the user enters the value s/he sees at that moment on the token, the server uses its own
time value to calculate, based on the username and his/her original seed value, what value should
be displayed on at user’s token at that time. If these user-entered values and the stored values
match, authentication is successful. The RSA SecurID ® is generally used as a second factor in a
two-factor authentication.

4.2.1 Summary of Functionality
The RSA SecurID ® system can be securely emulated in software (a soft token). Two
independent computer systems with synchronized clocks using a shared secret key or using
public key cryptography can provide authenticated access to each other in the same manner as
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the hardware token system described above. We chose to use a soft token for our baseline
testing.

4.2.2 Experimental Setup
As previously described, all four experiment modules are intended to be integrated into
a larger testing construct with integrated user instructions, test functionality and data collection.
Test 2 is visualized to require a standard office desk and chair, two cell phones and standard
laptop or desktop computer with a standard display and keyboard. The computer needs to be
connected to a network with WiFi communication capability and will act as an authentication
server and will also display the experiment instructions and questionnaire to the TP. In its role as
a server, the computer will collect the test data . For our experimental setup I chose to use two
Android LG Tribute 2 cell phones. These phones have the LTE Qualcomm Snapdragon 1.2 GHz
quad-core processor, 1 GB of RAM, 8 GB of expandable storage space, a 4.5 inch IPS screen
with 480x854 pixels, a 1900 mAh battery, a 5 MP rear camera and a 1.3 MP front facing camera.
These phones are not connected to a telephone or internet service provider’s network but are
used here as independent computing devices and connect only to the WiFi network as
specifically instructed within the experiment. This experiment requires that the two phones are
placed on the desk immediately in front of the TP and in front of the display so there needs to be
room for this on the desk surface.
One phone runs the OTP generator application and the other runs the OTP login
application. Before the experiment is run, the phone running the OTP generator application is
registered with the authentication server in order to share a secret key (seed). This phone is
disconnected from the server and then independently simulates an RSA SecurID ® token by
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generating a series of OTPs at fixed time intervals. The phone that runs the OTP login
application simulates a login. The authentication server has a database of key seeds from
registered devices and a synchronized clock that it uses to calculate the expected current value of
the key. The login phone is connected to the authentication server via WiFi.

4.2.3 Operation of Experiment
The test administrator (TA) will turn both phones on and open the “OTPgenerator”
application on one phone and place it on the desk to the left of the TP. The TA will open the
“OTPlogin” application on the other and place that phone on the desk to the right of the TP. The
OTP generator phone will display a “start experiment” button, the OTP Login will display the
login screen. A photo of the OTP login screen is shown in Figure 4.3.

Figure 4.3. Test 2 Login Screen. This is a photo of the OTP login screen.
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The TA will instruct the TP to follow the instructions on the computer and will demonstrate
navigating (i.e. swiping or mousing) on the computer to get to the next page.
The computer will display simple experiment instructions with photos of the two
phones. The instructions will tell the TP that s/he has to enter the code s/he sees on the left
phone into the login screen on the right phone and the code on the left phone will be visible for
only 10 seconds. If s/he is not able to enter the code in that time a new code will be generated
and s/he should try to type in the new code. S/he should continue until s/he receives a message
that s/he has successfully completed 10 logins.
The TP will read through the instructions and then, when s/he is ready, the TP will open
the application on both phones to start experiment. The left phone will display the simulated
RSA SecurID ®screen with blank six digit number and a blank count down timer. The phone
will have a first screen with a “generate code” button (not yet implemented). The TP will select
the button “generate code” on the left phone and it will display a 6 digit number. A photo of the
simulated RSA SecureID(R) is shown in Figure 4.4.

Figure 4.4. Test 2 Showing OTP Generation. This is a photo of the simulated RSA SecureID ®
screen with a random key displayed.
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The TP will touch the “type otp here” input box on the right phone and a keyboard will
pop up. The TP will type in the OTP s/he sees displayed on the first phone into the simulated
login display on the second phone. The second phone sends the input to the authentication
server. At this time this input is not encrypted but as future work this communication should be
added to this communication. The authentication server calculates the expected current value of
the key, compares the expected current value to the input and returns a result (match or not
match) value to the simulated login phone. The login phone will display a login success or
failure message to the TP. The server also measures the start time and stop time at various points
of the soft token authentication process, measures the number of successful and total tries at
authentication and stores this data and the calculated elapsed times in a file for the researchers to
use in their usability analysis. When the TP has successfully logged in 10 times the right phone
will display an “experiment is complete” message.

4.2.4 Detail of Code
The code that obtains the data in this experiment is designed as follows: This system
has a two client and one server configuration. My colleague, Cagri Cetin designed and built an
authentication server for the original demonstration of this system. For my contribution to this
project I modified his authentication server to incorporate the simulated RSA SecurID ®. I
added the following functionality to the server code 1) store the OTP, 2) check the OTP against
input, and 3) capture the timing of various user actions. The authentication server was written in
Java SE-1.6 using Spring Tool Set (STS), an Eclipse based development environment, so I also
used this system for the modifications.
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4.2.4.1 Login Screen Appearance
I created two original Android applications for the two clients, which I wrote in
Android Studio Version 2.1.2. The first client is “OTPgenerator” which contains a Java function
and associated sub-functions and display functionality. In this function the following actions
occur:
1) start a 10 second count down timer,
2) calculate and display the number of seconds remaining,
3) generate a 32-bit secret using the Java library function generatebase32secret which
outputs a string,
4) take the first 6 characters in the string and output them to text view,
5) end the string to the authentication server (for matching), and
6) reset the countdown timer.
The function calls the display functions. I also designed a layout which is stored in the
program resources file. This is an HTML layout of the image to be seen by the user and is
intended to mimic the RSA SecurID ®’s appearance by displaying the six digits and the number
of seconds remaining that these digits will be displayed.
The second client is “OTPLogin” which is another Java function and associated subfunctions and display functionality. In this function the following actions occur:
1) outputs a layout for user input,
2) “listens” for input and puts onclicklistener inputs into variables,
3) ends the variables to the authentication server (for matching),
4) receives notice if a match has occurred or not
5) clears the screen and outputs either a success or failure message depending on the value
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of the result (it may also call a media player function because the success message is
animated). The function calls the display functions. I also created an .xml layout and
drawables for the OTPlogin and stored them in resources.

4.2.4.2 Data Collection
I include time capture functionality for experiment measurements in the OTPlogin
application and in the server code. In the OTPlogin application I add code in the login function
to record the time when the screen is first opened, the time when the user’s cursor is placed in the
“Type OTP here” data entry box (I use the onFocusChangeListener function which calls
onFocusChange), and the time when the user clicks the “Verify OTP” button. The
onFocusChange function only takes one timestamp regardless of how many digits are typed in.
Every digit the user types runs the function but data is only collected on the first one. The
success or failure information is collected on the server side. These three times are converted
from data time objects into long integers and sent to the server by a function which concatenates
the numbers onto the URL when it sends the number that the user typed in. The variables are
then cleared.
On the server side, in the CheckOTP function in the HomeController, I bring in the time
capture data from the URL and put it into variables. I then put it into a log named “Test 2 data”
that is accessible in debug mode. As future work we can create an output structure and report
format to output this data for analysis.
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4.3 Test 3
In Tests 3 and 4 we are testing the usability of the co-authentication system for
comparison with the two baselines examined in tests 1 and 2. For the purposes of testing our
Collaborative authentication system against the baselines illustrated in Test 1 and Test 2, above, I
chose to use the new Bluetooth version as our testing model. For the purposes of testing I
assume that the initial pairing of the user’s devices has already been done and that is not part of
present usability testing. This mirrors actual usage and is a reasonable assumption.

4.3.1 Summary of Functionality
The functionality of the Bluetooth code is described in detail above, in section 3.2. The
functionality of the usability testing components is to measure the overall amount of time that the
authentication process takes using the co-authentication system. I created variables in the
Android app to capture timing information at the Android device and send it to the server when
the experiment is complete.

4.3.2 Experimental Setup
As previously described, all four experiment modules are intended to be integrated into
a larger testing construct with integrated user instructions, test functionality and data collection.
Test 3 and 4 are visualized to require a standard office desk and chair, two cell phones and
standard laptop or desktop computer with a standard display and keyboard. The computer needs
to be connected to a network with WiFi communication capability and will act as an
authentication server and will also display the experiment instructions and questionnaire to the
TP. In its role as a server, the computer will collect the test data. For our experimental setup I
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chose to use the same two Android LG Tribute 2 cell phones I used in Experiment 2. The cell
phones have new Bluetooth communication applications downloaded and resident on the phones.
The phones communicate with each other via Bluetooth and with the server via WiFi.

4.3.3 Operation of Experiment
Tests 3 and 4 are essentially the same test with one small difference: in one test (named
A for automatic) the authentication protocol starts as soon as registered devices are connected to
the authentication server, in the other test (named B for button), the authentication protocol
requires that devices ask the user for permission to complete the authentication process (such
permission is given by the user pressing a button on the requesting device). The two phones will
sit on the desk in front of the TP. The test instructions will show the TP how to open the
application on both phones and how to touch the start experiment button. In Test 3, the
automatic version, the TP opens the “3A” application on both phones. There is no user input
required and one phone will display authentication success or failure when it the authentication
process is done. If the other phone is not on and nearby and the application is not open on this
phone, authentication will not occur. The timing information is collected on the testing device
invisibly to the TP and is sent to the server at the completion of the experiment where it is
retrieved by the TAs for analysis.

4.3.4 Detail of Code
The detail of the new Bluetooth functionality is described in section 3.4, above. To
create testing capability I adding the following code:
1) I added a time stamp at the start of the onCreate function in MainActivity.
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2) I created a function to send this time stamp to the server.
3) I added a time stamp in the handleMessage function in the controlIfChallengeDone
function in BluetoothScanActivity.
4) I added another function also to send this time stamp to the server.
5) I added code to the server by adding a function receiveBTStartTime in the
HomeController to retrieve the two time stamps.

4.4 Test 4
Test 4 is identical to Test 3 but with the addition of one button displayed to the user
which, when pressed, starts the authentication process that automatically works in the Test 3
version.

4.4.1 Code for the Button Function
The button functionality is in the challenge success activity called by the scan activity.
It is a simple layout with the text “Approve Access” and onclick calls the success message
function. The primary reason for this button is to alert the user that a new device is requesting
access. If the user discovers one of his/her devices is stolen s/he can decline to press the approve
access button and prevent the new device from having access.

4.4.2 Operational Differences from Test 3
The two phones will sit on the desk in front of the TP. The test instructions will show
the TP how to open the application on both phones and how to touch the start experiment button.
In Test 4, the button version, the TP opens the “3B” application on both phones. One phone will
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display a button asking if the user requests authentication. The user touches this button to run
the authentication process. This phone will display authentication success or failure when it the
authentication process is done. If the other phone is not on and nearby and the application is not
open on this phone, authentication will not occur. The timing information is collected on the
testing device invisibly to the TP and is sent to the server at the completion of the experiment
where it is retrieved by the TAs for analysis.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

This thesis describes authentication, usability testing and one embodiment of the coauthentication system to provide context for future usability testing of the co-authentication
system. In this thesis I also describe the new work done to develop and implement an extension
of the co-authentication system to add a Bluetooth communication capability between tokens.
For the benefit of future co-authentication system development I have tried to modularize all
functional aspects and include hooks in the form of comments in the code for adding future token
communication capabilities such as biometrics. I hope that the description of adding the
Bluetooth capability in this thesis may serve as a roadmap for future developers adding other
communication capabilities.
This thesis also details the development and implementation of four new usability test
modules. Two of these simulate existing well-known authentication systems – the
username/password login in a browser and the hardware token one time password (OTP). This
thesis describes the addition of embedded usability (time to complete task) measurements. The
other two usability test modules embed usability (time to complete task) measurements. All four
test modules collect timing information taken in places in the respective codes that I believe are
functionally comparable from application to application. Obviously experimentation results may
inform this placement and the tests are presented here to highlight where future tuning may
occur. The user’s success rates are also important information and should be included in future
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work. Tests 1 and 2 output fairly well formatted data but in Tests 3 and 4, at this time, the data is
available in the debug mode. The data is all clearly separated by test number and I leave the
integration of the tests and statistical analysis tools for future work. I also leave the design of
usability mock-up models that will present TPs with realistic tasks to others.
The Co-authentication system has many possible embodiments and versions and I have
chosen just one to use for demonstration and proof of concept of usability testing. I hope I have
illustrated why usability testing is valuable to the design process in general and provided a useful
framework of some possible usability tests.
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APPENDIX A
USABILITY REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT

Please note that this is the original requirements document. Several things have
evolved including the co-authentication system protocol. The protocol shown in Figure 3.1 is the
correct one.
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